

BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

Essential Readings

Edited by
William Edelglass
Jay L. Garfield

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS
2009

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further
Oxford University's objective of excellence
in research, scholarship, and education.

Oxford New York
Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi
New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto

With offices in
Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece
Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore
South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam

Copyright © 2009 by Oxford University Press, Inc.

Published by Oxford University Press, Inc.
198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016
www.oup.com

Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,
without the prior permission of Oxford University Press.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Buddhist philosophy : essential readings / edited by William Edelglass
and Jay L. Garfield.

p. cm.

Includes translations of texts from various languages.

ISBN: 978-0-19-532817-2 (pbk.); 978-0-19-532816-5 (cloth)

1. Philosophy, Buddhist. 2. Buddhism—Doctrines. I. Edelglass, William.

II. Garfield, Jay L., 1955–

B162.B847 2009

181.043—dc22 2008018648

Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper

True vision is the vision that consists
of knowledge, nothing else; this is
why a scholar should focus on
seeking knowledge of reality. ...
Wisdom is the ambrosia that brings
satisfaction, the lamp whose light
cannot be obscured, the steps on the
palace of liberation, and the fire that
burns the fuel of the defilements.

—Bhāviveka¹

1. Bhāviveka, *The Heart of the Middle Way*, III.1, III.6, trans. Malcolm David Eckel.

articulated in “Mountains and Waters as Sūtras,” one of the chapters of his major work *Shobogenzo*, presented here.

Nishitani Keiji (1900–1990) continues in the twentieth century the Zen tradition brought to Japan by Dōgen in the thirteenth, but with an eye firmly on its Indian roots. Nishitani draws on a phenomenological reading of Indian Yogācāra thought and a Madhyamaka understanding of the identity of the two truths. He advances with great philosophical rigor the view, originating in Indian Buddhism, but articulated with such force by Dōgen, that awakened understanding must be a direct, nonconceptual, and nondual cognitive relation to reality.

1

Theravāda Metaphysics and Ontology

Kaccānagotta (Saṃyutta-nikāya) and Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha

Noa Ronkin

Start here

The Sutta-piṭaka

Although early Buddhism cannot be reduced to a systematic philosophy, what lies at its heart, according to its own understanding of the matter, is Dharma (Pali Dhamma). In Indian thought, Dharma is the truth about the world: the underlying nature of things, the way things are in reality. One might say, therefore, that at the heart of Buddhism lies a metaphysical Truth. Yet in the *Sutta-piṭaka*—the collection of the Buddha’s discourses in the Triple Basket collection of Pali texts regarded as canonical by the Theravāda school of Buddhism—the Dhamma is presented in a way that notably refrains from metaphysical underpinnings. The Dhamma is understood to be a path of practice in conduct, meditation, and understanding leading to the cessation of the fundamental suffering (*dukkha*) that underlies the human condition as lived in the round of rebirth (*saṃsāra*). The texts repeatedly state that the Buddha taught only what is conducive to achieving that goal of cessation, or nirvana (Pali *nibbāna*), and there are strong suggestions, as captured by the renowned undetermined questions, that purely theoretical speculations, especially those to do with certain metaphysical concerns about the ultimate nature of the world and one’s destiny, are both pointless and potentially misleading in the quest for nirvana.¹

1. For the ten undetermined questions see, for instance, *Majjhima-nikāya* I 426; *Anguttara-nikāya* V 193; *Dīgha-nikāya* I 187; *Saṃyutta-nikāya* IV 395. See also Gethin

Nevertheless, while it is true that the Buddha suspends all views regarding certain metaphysical questions, he is not an antimetaphysician: nothing in the texts suggests that metaphysical questions are completely meaningless, or that the Buddha denies the soundness of metaphysics *per se*. Instead, Buddhism teaches that to understand suffering, its rise, its cessation, and the path leading to its cessation is to see reality as it truly is. Reality, as seen through the lens of Buddhist epistemology, is not a container of persons and substances, but rather an assemblage of interlocking physical and mental processes that spring up and pass away subject to multifarious causes and conditions and that are always mediated by the cognitive apparatus embodied in the operation of the five aggregates (*khandhas*). Indeed, the main doctrinal teachings found in the *suttas*, including the postulate of impermanence (*anicca*), the principle of dependent origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*), and the teaching of not-self (*anattā*), are all metaphysical views concerning how processes work rather than what things are. Thus while the Dhamma is silent on ontological matters, it is grounded in what may be identified as process metaphysics: A framework of thought that hinges on the ideas that sentient experience is dependently originated and that whatever is dependently originated is conditioned (*saṅkhata*), impermanent, subject to change, and lacking independent selfhood. Construing sentient experience as a dynamic flow of physical and mental occurrences and rejecting the notion of a metaphysical self as an enduring substratum underlying experience, the Buddha's process metaphysics contrasts with substance metaphysics.²

Process metaphysics has deliberately chosen to reverse the primacy of substance: it insists on seeing processes as basic in the order of being, or at least in the order of understanding. Underlying process metaphysics is the supposition that encountered phenomena are best represented and understood in terms of occurrences—processes and events—rather than in terms of “things,” and with reference to modes of change rather than to fixed

1998: 66–68. All references to the Pali texts are to volume number and page of the Pali Text Society editions.

2. Western metaphysics has been dominated by a substance-attribute ontology, which has a marked bias in favor of “objects.” While Plato's view of reason and his doctrine of the realm of Forms illustrate the predominance of the notion of substance, substance metaphysics reached its highest perfection in Aristotle's writings and has thereafter dominated much of traditional philosophy from the ancient Stoics through the Scholastics of the Middle Ages and up to the distinguished authors of modern philosophy. Notwithstanding this dominance and its decisive ramifications for much of Western history of ideas, since as early as the period of the pre-Socratics another standpoint that goes against the mainstream current of Western metaphysics has been present. This variant line of thought, designated by modern scholarship as “process metaphysics” or “process philosophy,” focuses on the ontological category of occurrences—mainly events and processes—rather than on that of material objects, and is concerned with the notion of becoming rather than of being. See Rescher 1996.

stabilities. The guiding idea is that processes are basic and things derivative, for it takes some mental process to construct “things” from the indistinct mass of sense experience and because change is the pervasive and predominant feature of the real. The result is that *how* eventualities transpire is seen as no less significant than *what* sorts of things there are.³

The following selection from the *Samyutta-nikāya* shows that rather than deny metaphysics, the Dhamma urges one to understand *how* things are. It instructs one to avoid wrong views (*ditṭhi*), particularly the two extremes of existence and non-existence that are oftentimes referred to as eternalism and annihilationism.⁴ Instead, one should contemplate through meditative practice the middle way between these two extremes, and the middle way is articulated in terms of dependent origination and not-self.⁵

The *Samyutta-nikāya* was likely compiled as a repository for *suttas* disclosing the Buddha's metaphysical insight into the nature of reality, thus serving the needs of the doctrinal specialists in the monastic order and of those monks and nuns who had already fulfilled the preliminary stages of meditative training and were intent on developing direct realization of the ultimate truth. This supposition is supported by the text's nonsubstantialist perspective and its thematic arrangement of the doctrinal formulas that form classifications of the Buddha's discourses and culminate in the Abhidhamma—such as the twelvefold chain of dependent origination, the five aggregates, the six sense bases, the eight factors of the path, and the Four Noble Truths.⁶

Translation: *Kaccānagotta* (*Samyutta-nikāya* II 17–18)

At Sāvattṭhi. Then the Venerable Kaccānagotta approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and said to him: “Venerable sir,

3. For a detailed explanation of the early Buddhist interest in “how” experience and the self are, rather than in “what” they are, see Hamilton 2000, particularly chap. 5.

4. In the *Brahmajāla-sutta* that opens the *Dīgha-nikāya*, the Buddha lists sixty-two types of wrong view and refutes them all, particularly targeting eternalism and annihilationism. See *Dīgha-nikāya* I 12.

5. Gethin (1992: 155) says in this context: “The point that is being made is that reality is at heart something dynamic, something fluid: however one looks at it, reality is a process... True process, true change, cannot be explained either in terms of eternalism (a thing exists unchanging) or annihilationism (a thing exists for a time and then ceases to exist). The process of change as described by dependent arising is thus a middle between these two extremes, encapsulating the paradox of identity and difference involved in the very notion of change.”

6. See Bhikkhu Bodhi, introduction to *The Connected Discourses of the Buddha* 2000: 31–33. The following translation originally appeared in Bhikkhu Bodhi 2000. We gratefully acknowledge permission to republish this work.

it is said, 'right view, right view.' In what way, venerable sir, is there right view?"

"This world, Kaccāna, for the most part depends upon a duality—upon the notion of existence and the notion of nonexistence. But for one who sees the origin of the world as it really is with correct wisdom, there is no notion of nonexistence in regard to the world. And for one who sees the cessation of the world as it really is with correct wisdom, there is no notion of existence in regard to the world.

"This world, Kaccāna, is for the most part shackled by engagement, clinging, and adherence. But this one [with right view] does not become engaged and cling through that engagement and clinging, mental standpoint, adherence, underlying tendency; he does not take a stand about 'my self.' He has no perplexity or doubt that what arises is only suffering arising, what ceases is only suffering ceasing. His knowledge about this is independent of others. It is in this way, Kaccāna, that there is right view.

"'All exists': Kaccāna, this is one extreme. 'All does not exist': this is the second extreme. Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathāgata teaches the Dhamma by the middle: 'With ignorance as condition, volitional formations [come to be]; with volitional formations as condition, consciousness [comes to be]... name-and-form... the six sense-bases... contact... feeling... craving... clinging... existence... birth... aging-and-death [come to be]. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance comes cessation of volitional formations; with the cessation of volitional formations, cessation of consciousness...' Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering."

The Abhidhamma

The first conscious attempt to ground the Buddha's scattered teachings in a comprehensive philosophical system was introduced with the advance of the Abhidhamma (Sanskrit Abhidharma) tradition—a doctrinal movement in Buddhist thought that arose during the first centuries after the Buddha's death (fourth century B.C.E. onward) together with the spread of the Sangha across the Indian subcontinent. Having its own distinctive theoretical and practical interests, the Abhidhamma resulted in an independent branch of inquiry and literary genre documented in the third basket of the Pali canon, the *Abhidhamma-piṭaka*, its commentaries, and its various explicatory Abhidhamma manuals. This selection is taken from one such manual, the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, a compendium of the Theravādin Abhidhamma system that has long been the most commonly used introductory manual for the study of Abhidhamma in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia. The text is traditionally attributed to Anuruddha and was likely composed in the late sixth or early seventh century. To properly appreciate the implications of this text

for Buddhist metaphysics, however, one needs to understand something of the development of the Buddhist concept of *dhamma*.

In the Sutta literature, both the singular and plural forms *Dhamma/dhammas* ordinarily refer to the contents of the Buddha's discourses, to the fundamental principles he taught.⁷ In addition to signifying the basic elements of the Buddha's teaching, though, the plural term *dhammas* also denotes the objects that appear in one's consciousness while practicing insight meditation. These are particularly mental objects of the sixth sense faculty, namely, *manas* (a most ambiguous term in the Sutta literature that is normally translated as "mind"), alongside the objects of the five ordinary physical senses.⁸ By *dhammas*, then, the Buddha and his immediate followers understood the physical and mental processes that make up one's experiential world, and the nature of this experience was analyzed in such terms as the five aggregates, the twelve sense spheres, and the eighteen elements (*khandha, āyatana, dhātu*). The Abhidhamma, though, developed yet another mode of analysis that in its view was the most comprehensive and exhaustive, namely, the analysis of experience in terms of *dhammas*.

Within the specific context of meditation, the Abhidhamma significantly changed its conception of the plurality of *dhammas*. The Abhidhamma treatises draw subtle distinctions within the scope of the mental and systematize the term *manas* so that it acquires a host of different technical meanings. *Dhammas* are here reckoned a pluralistic representation of encountered phenomena; not merely mental objects, but all knowable sensory phenomena of whatever nature, namely, the phenomenal world in its entirety as we experience it through the senses. This broad rendering includes the narrower sense of *dhammas* as objects of *manas* when the latter signifies mental cognition qua an aspect of discriminative consciousness, or rather mental cognitive awareness (*manoviññāṇa*, often translated literally as "mind-consciousness"), now deemed the central cognitive operation within the process of sensory perception.⁹ *Dhammas* as the objects of mental cognitive awareness may now be rendered as apperceptions in the sense of rapid mental events by means of which the mind unites and assimilates a particular perception, especially one newly presented, to a larger set or mass of ideas already possessed, thus

7. That in this sense the singular and plural forms *dhamma/dhammas* are interchangeable (like "teaching" and "teachings" in English) is illustrated by recurring passages that refer to the Buddha's ninefold teaching (*navanīgambuddhasāsana*), i.e., the nine divisions of the Buddhist texts according to their form or style, although such passages must belong to a later period in which these distinct nine divisions were acknowledged. See, for instance, *Majjhima-nikāya* I 133; *Dīgha-nikāya* II 100; *Āṅguttara-nikāya* II 103, 178, and III 88; and *Vinaya* III 8. It is customary to apply the uppercase Dhamma to the Buddhist teaching and the lowercase *dhamma/s* to the individual doctrinal principles that make up the teaching.

8. E.g., *Majjhima-nikāya* III 62; *Saṃyutta-nikāya* I 113 and 115–16, II 140 (here all the senses are referred to as *dhātu*), IV 114 and 163; *Āṅguttara-nikāya* I 11.

9. E.g., *Vibhaṅga* 10, 14–15, 54, 60–2 and 71; *Dhātukathā* 7–8, 34, 41, 63, and 67; *Kāthāvatthu* 12, 19–20, and 67.

comprehending and conceptualizing it. Insofar as these dhammic apperceptions interact with the five sensory modalities of cognitive awareness that arise in dependence on their corresponding material phenomena, then they are fleeting “flashes” of psychophysical events as presented in consciousness.

Thus, in the canonical Abhidhamma literature, a *dhamma* acquires the technical sense of an object of a specific mental capability called mental cognitive awareness and, in this sense, an instance of one of the fundamental, short-lived physical and mental events that interact to produce the world as we experience it. The Abhidhamma provides a systematic account of the constitution of sentient experience by offering a method of describing any possible *dhamma* instance, both in its exclusiveness and in relation to its causal origins and conditioning factors. The overarching inquiry subsuming both the analysis of *dhammas* and their synthesis into a unified structure is called the “*dhamma* theory.”¹⁰

The *dhammas* fall into four broad categories—consciousness (*citta*), mentalities (*cetasika*), materiality (*rūpa*), and nirvana—each of which is analyzed in great detail.¹¹ Consciousness is divided into eighty-nine basic types of consciousness moments, assemblages of consciousness and associated mentalities that are organized by various guidelines, the most fundamental of which reveals a fourfold hierarchy according to four spheres. At the bottom of this fourfold psychological hierarchy are the fifty-four types of sensuous-sphere consciousness (*kāmāvacara*): a broad category typical of the normal state of mind of human beings, but also of hell beings, animals, and various kinds of divine being known as the lower gods (*devas*), all of whom are reborn in the existential plane of the five senses. Next there are the fifteen types of consciousness pertaining to the sphere of pure form (*rūpāvacara*), followed by the twelve types of consciousness of the formless sphere (*arūpāvacara*), and culminating in the eight kinds of supra-mundane or transcendent (*lokuttara*) consciousness that have *nibbāna* as their object.

The following selection from the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* includes only the analysis of the sense-sphere consciousness, beginning with unwholesome consciousnesses at the bottom, followed by consciousnesses that concern the mechanics of bare awareness of the objects of the five senses, and then by wholesome sense-sphere consciousnesses. In technical Abhidhamma terms, our basic experience of the physical world is encompassed by a limited number of classes of sense-sphere consciousness that are the results of twelve unwholesome and eight wholesome classes of sense-sphere consciousnesses.

10. Thus none of the various other renditions of the word *dhamma* as “state,” “phenomenon,” “principle,” “teaching,” etc., conveys its precise meaning as the most basic technical term of the Abhidhamma.

11. Theravādin Abhidhamma describes eighty-two *dhammas* or possible types of occurrence encompassed in these four broad categories, but the term *dhamma* also signifies any particular categorial token. Thus, according to the Theravādin typology, there are eighty-two possible types of occurrence in the encountered world, not eighty-two occurrences.

Like the Nikāya worldview, then, the canonical Abhidhamma is accommodated within the category of antisubstantialist metaphysics, and the focus of its analysis of sentient experience is epistemological rather than ontological: it is concerned with the conditions of the psychophysical occurrences that arise in consciousness, and in this sense form one’s “world,” not with what exists per se in a mind-independent world. Yet the *dhamma* theory and its analysis of consciousness showcase the Abhidhamma’s shift from the implicit, process metaphysics operative in the Buddha’s teaching to an intricate event metaphysics. This system of thought now dissects the physical and mental processes that make up sentient experience into their constitutive consciousness moments, replacing the idea of a psychophysical process by the notion of a *dhamma* qua a mental event as analytical primitive and the basis of a complex theory of consciousness.

As part of its doctrinal development, the Abhidhamma was later subject to a gradual process of systematization and conceptual assimilation, accompanied by a growing tendency to reify the *dhammas* and an increasing interest in establishing their true nature. Thus, in the commentarial tradition, the concept of “particular nature” (*sabhāva*) plays a major role. Often understood as “essence,” *sabhāva* is regarded as that which gave an impetus to the Abhidhamma’s growing concern with ontology. The selection here includes an abridged version of the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*’s commentary, the *Abhidhammatthavibhāvinī*, that exemplifies the spirit of the postcanonical commentarial tradition and its use of the concept of *sabhāva*. The text is ascribed to Sumaṅgala and is dated to the twelfth century.¹²

Translation: Summary of the Topics of Abhidhamma

(*Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*) by Anuruddha and Exposition of the Topics of the Abhidhamma (*Abhidhammatthavibhāvinī*) by Sumaṅgala being a commentary to Anuruddha’s *Summary of the Topics of Abhidhamma*.

Homage to him, the Blessed One, the Worthy One, the Perfectly Awakened One.

Prologue

1. Having paid respect to the incomparable Perfectly Awakened One, along with the Good Dhamma and the Supreme Community, I shall utter the Summary of the Topics of Abhidhamma.

12. The following translation originally appeared in Wijeratne and Gethin 2002. We gratefully acknowledge permission to republish this work.

Chapter 1: Consciousness

2. The topics of Abhidhamma spoken of therein in full are from the ultimate standpoint four: consciousness, mentalities, materiality, and *nibbāna*.

Commentary

Consciousness (citta) is that which is conscious; the meaning is that it knows (*viñāṇāti*) an object. [...]

Or else consciousness is the means by which the associated *dharmas* are conscious. Alternatively, consciousness is the mere act of being conscious (*cintana*). For it is its mere occurrence in accordance with conditions that is called “a *dhamma* with its own particular nature” (*sabhāva-dhamma*). In consideration of this, it is the definition of the particular natures of ultimate *dharmas* that is taken as absolute; the explanation by way of agent (*kattar*) and instrument (*karana*) should be seen as a relative manner of speaking. For a *dhamma*'s being treated as an agent, by attributing the status of “self” to the particular function of a *dhamma*, and also its being [treated] in consequence as an instrument, by attributing the state of agent to a group of concomitant *dharmas*, are both taken as a relative manner of speaking. The explanation in these terms should be understood as for the purpose of indicating the nonexistence of an agent, etc. apart from the particular nature of a *dhamma*. The meaning of the word *citta* is also elaborated as that which causes variegation and so on. [...]

That which exists in the mind by occurring in dependence upon it is *mentality (cetasika)*. For it is unable to take an object without consciousness; in the absence of consciousness there is no arising of any mentality at all. But consciousness does occur with an object in the absence of certain mentalities; so mentality is said to occur in dependence upon consciousness. [...]

That which is afflicted (*ruppatti*) is *materiality (rupa)*; that which “comes to or is brought to change (*vikāra*) as a result of such opposing conditions as cold and heat” is what is meant. [...]

That which is deliverance (*nikkhanta*) from craving, considered as “entanglement” (*vāna*) because it stitches and weaves together existence and nonexistence, or that by means of which the fires of greed, etc., are extinguished (*nibbāti*) is *nibbāna*.

Stop here; can read further if you like

3. Therein, to take consciousness first, it is fourfold: that which belongs to the sense sphere, that which belongs to the form sphere, that which belongs to the formless sphere, that which is transcendent.

4. Therein what belongs to the sense sphere? [Consciousness] accompanied by happiness, associated with view, and without prompting¹³ is one kind; the same with prompting is one kind; consciousness accompanied by happiness, dissociated from view, and without prompting is one kind; the same with prompting is one kind; consciousness accompanied by equanimity, associated with view, and without prompting is one kind; the same with prompting is one kind; consciousness accompanied by equanimity, dissociated from view, and without prompting is one kind; the same with prompting is one kind. All these eight are called the consciousnesses accompanied by greed.

Commentary

Among these four kinds of consciousness, sense-sphere consciousness is also fourfold by division into wholesome, unwholesome, resultant, and *kiriya*.¹⁴ Later he will use the term “beautiful” for the fifty-nine or ninety-one types of consciousness that are neither demeritorious nor without motivations in the phrase *apart from the bad and unmotivated they are called beautiful*; so that he can do this, he explains the demeritorious and motivationless first of all. Among these, because consciousnesses accompanied by greed arise from the start in the consciousness processes of one who has taken rebirth, these are explained first; next, because of their similarity in having two motivations, he explains those accompanied by unhappiness, and then those with one motivation. Dividing it into eight by the classification of feeling, wrong-view and volition, he explains the root of greed with the words beginning accompanied by happiness.

Herein, “happy mind” (*sumano*) means a pleasant mind or someone who has that, that is, the consciousness [itself] or the person with that consciousness. The state of that [consciousness or person], because it gives rise to

13. Prompting (*saṅkhāra*) is a mental coefficient of and the requisite for an instance of consciousness, what constitutes its potentiality. For example, according to Buddhaghosa, when one, unhesitatingly and unurged by others, performs such merit as giving, then one's consciousness is unprompted (*asaṅkhārika*). But when one performs merit hesitatingly, out of incomplete generosity, or because one was urged to do so by others, then one's consciousness is prompted (*saṅkhārika*). See *Visuddhimagga* XIV 84.

14. Gethin explains in his introduction to the translation of the text (p. xx): “The term *kiriya* means literally something like ‘action’ and is used in the Abhidhamma to qualify those mental events or states of consciousness that neither produce kammic results (*vipāka*) nor themselves constitute such results: *kiriya* states are neither kamma—whether wholesome or unwholesome—nor its result. As such, *kiriya* is used to characterize two broad types of consciousness: first certain basic consciousnesses that occur for all beings as part of the process of being conscious; secondly and more significantly the consciousness of the arahat, which, since it is free of the motivations of greed, hatred and delusion, does not produce results to be experienced in future births.”

the name and idea of this, is happiness (*somanassa*). It is a term for pleasant mental feeling. Accompanied by this, joined by virtue of arising as one and so forth, or "in that state of arising as one," is being *accompanied by happiness*.

View (*ditṭhi*) is "seeing wrongly." For since a general word can have a particular referent according to context and so forth, here, view is stated as just "wrong seeing." [...]

Prompting is what prepares and equips the consciousness in the form of furnishing it with energy, or consciousness is prepared and equipped by it in the said fashion. It is that exertion of oneself or others which precedes by way of giving assistance to a consciousness that is slowing down in a particular action. In this case the prompting designates the consciousness's particular state of energy when it has arisen because of the preceding occurrence in the consciousness-flow of oneself or of others. When that is not there, it is unprompted; just this is *without prompting* (*asaṅkhārika*). Along with prompting is *with prompting* (*sasaṅkhārika*). Thus it is said:

The particular quality [which is] produced by the preceding exertion and which produces the consciousness is prompting; it is by virtue of this that there is here the condition of [being] without prompting, and so on.

Or else with prompting and without prompting are stated entirely with reference to the presence or absence of prompting, not on account of its presence or absence in the [preceding] associated activity [of consciousness]: a consciousness that occurs by virtue of the actual existence of prompting, even when that prompting occurs in a different flow [of consciousness], has prompting and so is *with prompting*. [...]

Perceiving, experiencing, or feeling appropriately or fittingly by staying in the manner of being in the middle is *equanimity* (*upekkhā*). Alternatively, equanimity is perception (*ikkhā*) or experience that possesses (*upeta*), is joined to and not obstructed by pleasure and pain; for when pleasure and pain are not obstructions, it occurs adjoining them. *Accompanied by equanimity*: this is in the way stated. [...]

The respective arising of these eight [types of consciousness] should be understood as follows. When one joyfully enjoys the objects of the senses in association with such wrong views as "there is no danger, etc., in sense objects" or when, with a mind that is naturally sharp, without effort, one considers as intrinsically worthy (*maṅgala*) things that are seen, then the first unwholesome consciousness arises. When one does so with a mind that is sluggish and with effort, then the second arises. When wrong views are not present and one joyfully takes full pleasure in sexual intercourse or strongly desires another's wealth or takes another's goods with a mind that is naturally sharp, without effort, then the third consciousness arises. When one does so with a mind that is sluggish and with effort, then the fourth arises. When, either because of something wanting in the sense-objects or because of the absence of the other causes of happiness, they are without happiness in the four cases, then the remaining four accompanied by equanimity arise.

5. Consciousness accompanied by unhappiness, associated with aversion, and without prompting is one kind; the same with prompting is one kind; these two together are called the consciousnesses associated with aversion.

6. Consciousness accompanied by equanimity, associated with doubt is one kind; consciousness accompanied by equanimity, associated with restlessness is one kind; these two together are called the very deluded consciousnesses.

7. And so in this way twelve unwholesome consciousnesses have been given in full.

8. Those rooted in greed [can be] eightfold, those rooted in hatred twofold, and those rooted in delusion twofold—in this way the unwholesome can be twelve.

9. Eye-consciousness accompanied by equanimity, and similarly ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, and tongue-consciousness; body-consciousness accompanied by pain, receiving consciousness accompanied by equanimity, and investigating consciousness accompanied by equanimity: these seven consciousnesses are called unwholesome-resultant consciousnesses.

10. Eye-consciousness accompanied by equanimity [... as above], and investigating consciousness accompanied by happiness: these eight consciousnesses are called wholesome-resultant unmotivated consciousnesses.

11. Five-door-averting consciousness accompanied by equanimity; mind-door-averting consciousness accompanied by equanimity; smile-producing consciousness accompanied by happiness: these three are called unmotivated *kiriya* consciousnesses.

12. In this way eighteen unmotivated consciousnesses have been given in full.

13. The unwholesome results are seven, the meritorious results eight, the *kiriya* consciousnesses three: hence the unmotivated are eighteen.

14. Apart from the bad and the unmotivated, consciousnesses are called beautiful; there are fifty-nine or ninety-one of them.

Commentary

In this way thirty types of consciousness as twelve unwholesome and eighteen without motivations have been indicated; next, in order to establish

the designation “beautiful” for those apart from these, the words beginning *Apart from the bad and the unmotivated* are said. Apart from the [consciousnesses which are] bad because of leading to the suffering of the realms of misfortune, etc., produced by oneself, and apart from the [consciousnesses that are] without motivations because of non-association with motivations, the twenty-four sense-sphere and the thirty-five higher and transcendent [consciousnesses] come to *fifty-nine* consciousnesses; alternatively, when the eight types of transcendent consciousness have each been increased fivefold by distinction of the associated *jhāna* factors, they come to *ninety-one*; leading to beautiful qualities and being associated with the wholesome motivations of lack of greed etc., they are *called or said to be beautiful*.

15. Consciousness accompanied by happiness, associated with knowledge, and without prompting is one kind; the same with prompting is one kind. Consciousness accompanied by happiness, dissociated from knowledge, and without prompting is one kind; the same with prompting is one kind. Consciousness accompanied by equanimity, associated with knowledge, and without prompting is one kind; the same with prompting is one kind. Consciousness accompanied by equanimity, dissociated from knowledge, and without prompting is one kind; the same with prompting is one kind. All these eight are called wholesome consciousnesses belonging to the sense-sphere.

16. Consciousness accompanied by happiness [... as above]. All these eight are called sense-sphere resultant consciousnesses with motivations.

17. Consciousness accompanied by happiness [... as above]. All these eight are called sense-sphere *kiriya* consciousnesses with motivations.

18. And so in this way twenty-four sense-sphere wholesome, resultant, and *kiriya* consciousnesses which have motivations have been given in full.

19. By division of feeling, knowledge, and prompting, the sense-sphere meritorious, resultant and *kiriya* [consciousnesses] with motivations are reckoned as twenty-four.

20. In the sense sphere there are twenty-three results, twenty meritorious and demeritorious, and eleven *kiriya*; all together there are fifty-four.

Commentary

Now to indicate all the types of consciousness belonging to the sense sphere being grouped together, the words beginning *In the sense sphere twenty-three* are said. In the sense sphere there are seven unwholesome resultants, sixteen wholesome resultants with and without motivations, thus there are

twenty-three resultant [consciousnesses]; there are twelve unwholesome and eight wholesome [consciousnesses] making *twenty meritorious and demeritorious* [consciousnesses]; three without motivations and eight with motivations make *eleven kiriya* [consciousnesses]; *all together* by internal division of wholesome, unwholesome, resultant and *kiriya* [consciousness], there are just *fifty-four* [consciousnesses], although they are innumerable by division of time, place and individual consciousness continuity; this is the meaning.

Bibliography and Suggested Reading

- Bodhi, Bhikkhu, trans. (2000) *The Connected Discourses of the Buddha: A New Translation of the Saṃyutta Nikāya, Vol. 1*. Oxford: The Pali Text Society in association with Wisdom Publications.
- Cousins, L. S. (1981) “The Paṭṭhāna and the Development of the Theravādin Abhidhamma.” *Journal of the Pali Text Society* 9: 22–46.
- Cousins, L. S. (1995) “Abhidhamma.” In J. R. Hinnells, ed., *A New Dictionary of Religions*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Gethin, Rupert. (1998) *The Foundations of Buddhism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gethin, Rupert. (1992) *The Buddhist Path to Awakening: A Study of Bodhipakkhiyā Dhammā*. Leiden: Brill.
- Gombrich, Richard F. (1996) *How Buddhism Began: The Conditioned Genesis of the Early Teachings*. London: Athlone Press.
- Hamilton, Sue. (2000) *Early Buddhism: A New Approach*. Richmond, Surrey, England: Curzon Press.
- Karunadasa, Y. (1996) *The Dhamma Theory: Philosophical Cornerstone of the Abhidhamma*. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society.
- Rescher, Nicholas. (1996) *Process Metaphysics: An Introduction to Process Philosophy*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Ronkin, Noa. (2005) *Early Buddhist Metaphysics: The Making of a Philosophical Tradition*. Critical Studies in Buddhism Series and the Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies Monograph Series. London: Routledge-Curzon.
- Steward, Helen. (1997) *The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes and States*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Wijeratne, R.P. and Rupert Gethin, trans. (2002) *The Summary of the Topics of Abhidhamma, Exposition of the Topics of Abhidhamma*. Oxford: The Pali Text Society.