

Matthew Calarco, "Identity, Difference, Indistinction." *The New Centennial Review*, Vol. 11, No.2, 2012, pp. 41-60.

Page # of The Bedford Handbook: 17

PAGE #	CONCEPT, DEFINITIONS, OR QUOTES ETC	NOTES/CONNECTIONS TO MYSELF
41	Approaches to this study: focus on identity, difference, and indistinction. All three of these are examined "with an eye toward their transformative potential for struggles for justice involving animal life and human-animal relations..."	Interesting to describe these different approaches as examining a struggle for justice, a deeper notion than most consider when thinking of animal ethics
42	Identity based approach: This acknowledges the fact that animals are more closer in identity to humans than many care to note. Thus, "the rational moral agent has to disavow the species barrier as a persuasive reason for not extending full moral consideration to nonhuman animals."	Therefore, if one cannot use this reason, what other reasons are there for not extending these rights to animals?
43	This identity approach has inspired new practices and forms of resistance that focus on granting basic ethical respect to animals	One point of merit for this approach
43	This approach has also inspired an effort to be critical about drawing distinctions between animals and humans.	Another point of merit for this approach
44	However, there is also criticism for this approach as it does not seem to do enough in regards to animal-human relations.	Though it seems complicated to address such issues in these terms, this concept is what made it most understandable to me.
45	"Traditional boundaries drawn between human beings and animals based on humans having logos and animals lacking it are deeply questionable."	This claim is too basic, as it leaves logocentrism unexamined in certain regards.
47	Issue with anthropocentrism, which appears to be when privileges are extended to a class of beings that fulfill a certain conception of what it means to be more human vs less human, and which is reinforced by the identity approach.	Part of me questions if reality is truly this deep? Are these truly the underlying reasons behind certain injustices?
47	"If ethics is thought solely on the basis of extending morally relevant human traits to animals, there can be only limited overlap with this kind of environmentalist thinking and practice..."	This point is confusing, but I think I understand: there is a distinction between ending certain injustices and extending full justice

Questions:

1. If the identity approach is as flawed as it is made to seem in the reading, is there a different approach that presents itself as more encompassing of these different goals for ethics when it comes to animals?
2. Is it at all possible to accomplish these goals of justice under the identity approach, will it forever remain too narrow?

Tom Regan, "The Case for Animal Rights." *The Animal Ethics Reader*, 2nd ed., edited by Susan J. Armstrong and Richard G. Botzler, Routledge, 2008, pp. 19-25.

PAGE #	CONCEPT, DEFINITIONS, OR QUOTES ETC	NOTES/CONNECTIONS TO MYSELF
19	Moral agents: have the ability to do right and wrong, and therefore should be held morally accountable to their actions. Moral patients: cannot formulate the difference between right and wrong, and though they can take actions that affect others, cannot be held accountable to these actions.	It is interesting to make this distinction, a point that many are likely aware of but that many forget on a day to day basis.
20	The author appears to be making a claim that the same rights that are given to humans that fall in this category should be extended to animals that also fall in the same category.	After the last reading, I cannot help but feel that this "identity" approach to animal rights is somewhat flawed.
21	Individuals are equal in value, as each individual has an inherent value that does not change based on the value of their individual experiences. This is held across the board for moral agents.	This is a point that I can get behind: despite one's different factors in their life, everyone is value in their own unchangeable way.
22	To be alive is not enough, one must also have subject-of-a-life status, which requires that it have more thinking capabilities. This subject-of-a-life status is the relevant similarity between moral agents and patients.	Once this distinction is made, the argument that is being made here becomes more obvious.
23	"It is not an act of kindness to treat animals respectfully. It is an act of justice. It is not 'the sentimental interests' of moral agents that grounds our duties of justice to children, the retarded, the senile, or other moral patients, including animals. It is respect for their inherent value. The myth of the privileged moral status of moral agents has no clothes."	This entire quote is incredibly impactful. I read it several times over, as it makes its point very loudly.
25	The miniride principle and the worse-off principle make cases for when harming certain subjects over others follows logically.	These principles appear to be disputable despite their claims.

Questions:

1. Though the author appears to put values on certain comparable harms and comes to conclusions based on these assignments, how would one translate this to real life where values are not as easily distinguishable?
2. Is the author making the claim that only certain animals that fit the description of moral patient that is being set forth are deserving of these different rights?

PAGE #	CONCEPT, DEFINITIONS, OR QUOTES ETC	NOTES/CONNECTIONS TO MYSELF
36	"The principle also implies that the fact that beings are not members of our species does not entitle us to exploit them, and similarly the fact that other animals are less intelligent than we are does not mean that their interests may be disregarded."	A connection is made from slavery to animals, as just because other humans are different or less intelligent does not mean they have less rights.
37	Emphasis is put on one's capability to suffer or enjoy things.	This is what marks the distinction between deserving rights and not.
38	Suffering, by the author's perspective, can indeed be compared and put on a scale that weighs more and less drastic sufferings.	Therefore, there can be reasonable arguments made to certain actions on animals vs humans.
38	Though many objections about the comparisons of sufferings can be made, the claim that is stated is enough to drastically reduce present suffering.	Basically, even with objections, this argument does a great amount to help animals if applied.
40	Strong arguments are made in support of the reduction of meat eating, particularly when those animals are made to suffer and the consumption of meat is not entirely necessary.	As a vegetarian, this section nicely summarizes some of my reasons for choosing to be so.
40	"If forcing a rat to choose between starving to death and crossing an electrified grid to obtain food tells us anything about the reactions of humans to stress, we must assume that the rat feels stress in this kind of situation."	This presents itself as a logical argument in reference to experimenting on animals. Also, the experiments listed that have no positive effect on humans made me :(
42	It is shown that animals can feel pain because of the ways that they express such pain w/o words.	The point made about plants proves to be an interesting one.
44	'Why should I do anything for posterity? What has posterity ever done for me?'	But some individuals actually abide by this argument.
45	A logical argument is made in defense of killing some animals, however these conditions do not apply to the reality of many situations.	It is in fact more difficult to find a reality that abides by these standards than one that does not.

Questions:

1. Though the author lists many examples of experiments that cause animal suffering yet produce no good for humans, does that imply that there might indeed be experiments that benefit humans at the expense of animals? Can these ever be justified?
2. From my perspective, many of these arguments are sound. What objections would be brought forth by someone that disagrees with these claims but also truly understands the points being made?

Research Charts Week One

Calarco, Matthew. "Identity, Difference, Indistinction." *The New Centennial Review*, vol. 11, no. 2, 2012, pp. 41–49.

Page # of *The Bedford Handbook* you used as a model for your entry: 15

PAGE	CONCEPT, DEFINITIONS, OR QUOTES, ETC.	NOTES/CONNECTIONS TO MYSELF
41	<p>"[...] all of which would have us fundamentally reconsider the <i>ontological, ethical, and political</i> issues surrounding animal life and the human/animal distinction" [emphasis mine].</p> <p>This distinction, which implies a complex relationship, can be assessed within different frameworks (i.e., ontological, ethical, etc.), some of which may align and some of which may not.</p>	As you read along, attempt to categorize the author's points within these (and other) frameworks, if possible. Are any of them more important than the others (like ethics, for example). If so, why?
41	"Rather, I examine all three of these modes of thought and practice with an eye toward their transformative potential for struggles for justice involving animal life and human-animal relations [...]"	One of two possible thesis statements, the first one beginning "In this paper" and addressed in the previous entry.
42	<p>Darwinian ontology in terms of identity: Humanity must consider its identity vis-à-vis its origin as essentially animalistic. Freud considers this realization unavoidably traumatic (and probably hypersexual).</p> <p>Normative impartiality in terms of identity: When humans actively consider this relationship in juxtaposition to the general moral principle of impartiality, they can no longer justify withholding the rights from animals that they allow themselves. This is because any identity-based difference between humans and non-humans is superficial—"differences in degree rather than kind."</p>	Within this view, terms such as "non-human" become non sequiturs. A largemouth bass is not non-human; it's simply <i>less</i> human.
N/A	Consequentialist: "Consequentialism, as its name suggests, is simply the view that normative properties depend only on consequences. This historically important and still popular	Normative properties: claims about the nature of the world...?

	<p>theory embodies the basic intuition that what is best or right is whatever makes the world best in the future, because we cannot change the past, so worrying about the past is no more useful than crying over spilled milk” (SEP).</p> <p>Deontological ethics: “The word deontology derives from the Greek words for duty (<i>deon</i>) and science (or study) of (<i>logos</i>). In contemporary moral philosophy, deontology is one of those kinds of normative theories regarding which choices are morally required, forbidden, or permitted. In other words, deontology falls within the domain of moral theories that guide and assess our choices of what we ought to do (deontic theories), in contrast to those that guide and assess what kind of person we are and should be (aretaic [virtue] theories). And within the domain of moral theories that assess our choices, deontologists—those who subscribe to deontological theories of morality—stand in opposition to <i>consequentialists</i>” (SEP).</p>	<p>How it <i>ought</i> to be...?</p> <p>The biggest distinction between these two theories seems to be that consequentialists value <i>results</i> and that deontologists value <i>reasons</i>.</p>
42	<p>There are two primary justifications for the identity-based approach to resolving the human/animal distinction.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Practical. By virtue of its opposition to the standard view, it has managed to inspire discussion on the topic of animal rights. 2) Intellectual. It has challenged the binary understanding of humans and animals, suggesting something more complex and therefore disrupting the apparent “sophistication” of old theories. 	<p>This last one I liken to the radical ethical and social shifts that can result from significant scientific discoveries or even political movements—such as the Civil Rights Movement undermining the rigor of academic racism or the Newtonian model of the universe undermining the <i>cosmic</i> authority of the Catholic church.</p>
43-44	<p>The weaknesses of identity-based methods include over-intellectualization (i.e., prioritizing theory over action) and the internalization of moral responsibility. In this second example, animal rights activists and philosophers adopt personal lifestyle changes instead of encouraging large-scale societal change. This passive style of activism, while morally satisfying, yields feeble fruits.</p>	<p>Could something similar be said about Marxism (and other alternative social structures) as well...?</p>

<p>45-46</p>	<p>Logocentrism: “[...] placing the human logos (reason, speech, knowledge, self-presence, and so on) at the center of thought and practice [...]”</p> <p>Anthropocentrism: “In the context of animal ethics [...]; granting ethical priority to animals that resemble human beings in morally relevant ways, while denigrating or giving subordinate status to those animals who do not “properly” resemble human beings.”</p> <p>This final point allows a particular inequality to breed within a movement that is by definition concerned with universal equality.</p> <p>More importantly, it suggests that what makes animals <i>significant</i> are their resemblance to human creatures. While good intentioned, this belies the normative impartiality mentioned above by devaluing the animal traits in humans and favoring the human traits found in animals.</p>	<p>Calarco’s issues with logocentrism, to me, seem unresolvable. If his primary issue with rationality is that it lacks love or soul or something more emotional, then he is correct in recognizing a difference <i>in efficacy</i> between methodology and passion. However, actions need logical foundation to be considered worth performing.</p> <p>Compare to previous entry’s ruminations on consequentialist vs. deontological perspectives.</p>
<p>48</p>	<p>“At stake in these struggles are protecting, developing, and sustaining modes of life that have never been considered ‘properly’ human by the dominant culture and that have no desire to become so now.”</p>	<p>Animal ethics as written from a civil rights perspective.</p> <p>Not just ecological, and not just ethical; but... <i>civil</i>.</p>

Questions

1. By challenging logocentrism, is Calarco challenging the utility of philosophy itself? What approach—both individually and systemically—could resolve this alleged tension between righting social wrongs with passion and finding universal truths with the scientific method? Are they not compatible?
2. What justification do Calarco’s identity-based claims have without the “assumptions” of Darwinian evolutionary theory?

Regan, Tom. "The Case for Animal Rights." *The Animal Ethics Reader*, edited by Susan J. Armstrong and Richard G. Botzler, Routledge, 2008, pp. 19-25.

Page # of *The Bedford Handbook* you used as a model for your entry: 17

PAGE	CONCEPT, DEFINITIONS, OR QUOTES, ETC.	NOTES/CONNECTIONS TO MYSELF
19	<p>"Moral agents are individuals who have [...] the ability to bring impartial moral principles to bear on the determination of what [...] morally ought to be done."</p> <p>"Moral patients lack the prerequisites that would enable them to control their own behavior in ways that would make them accountable for what they do."</p>	<p>In one view, moral agents are the <i>best</i> of humanity; and moral patients are the <i>worst</i> of the animal kingdom.</p>
20	<p>"[...] that is, those who have desires and beliefs, who perceive, remember, and can act intentionally, who have a sense of the future, including their own future (i.e., are self-aware or self-conscious), who have an emotional life, who have a psychological identity over time, who have a kind of autonomy (namely, preference-autonomy), and who have an experiential welfare."</p>	<p>Compare "preference-autonomy" to ideas mentioned in Calarco.</p>
20	<p>"Unlike the case of the relationship that holds between moral agents, then, the relationship that holds between moral agents, on the one hand, and moral patients, on the other, is not reciprocal."</p>	
21	<p>The utilitarian-receptacle view of value: It is the specific content of an entity's experiences that give the entity value. Without these experiences, the entity would possess no value. Therefore, solely because the entity's value derives from the entity's experiences, the value of the entity's experiences can be used to determine the value of the entity.</p> <p>The postulate of inherent value: The entity possesses <i>inherent</i> value independent of the content of the entity's experiences. This inherent value derives from...</p>	<p>This is a useful rubric not only for exploring the human-animal relationship, but also for addressing broader issues of cultural, intellectual, and socioeconomic prejudice.</p>
21	<p>"[...] the optimal balance of goods over evils for all involved."</p> <p>Value is not only inherent, but it's also irreducible, which means that a single quantum of subjective value (say, one moral agent) is equivalent to any other quantum of subjective value (say, three moral agents). Does irreducibility negate the additive property? See explanation of <i>the miniride principle</i> below.</p> <p>This seems to directly contradict <i>the miniride principle</i>: "Given the postulate of inherent value, no harm done to <i>any</i> moral</p>	<p>Compare to John Stewart Mill.</p>

	<p>agent can possibly be justified merely on the grounds of its producing the best consequences for all affected by the outcome.</p> <p>Actually, the inclusion of “merely” might absolve it, as <i>the miniride principle</i> is a highly specific scenario.</p>	
23	<p>“It is not an act of kindness to treat animals respectfully. It is an act of justice. It is not “the sentimental interests” of moral agents that grounds our duties of justice to children, the retarded, the senile, or other moral patients, including animals. It is respect for their inherent value. The myth of the privileged moral status of moral agents has no clothes.”</p>	<p>One could argue that kindness is also just, although it would of course depend on the situation.</p>
25	<p><i>The miniride principle</i>: “Special considerations aside, when we must choose between overriding the rights of many who are innocent or the rights of few who are innocent, and when each affected individual will be harmed in a prima facie comparable way, then we ought to choose to override the rights of the few in preference to overriding the rights of the many.”</p>	<p>See notes and explanations on the irreducibility of value.</p>

Questions

1. Regarding inherent value and the subject-of-a-life criterion, what methodology is in place to verify if a living being qualifies? Are we left to the same devices as the Turing Test, which is to say... *appearance*?
2. Regan’s arguments *assume* that all life possesses inherent value. What logical arguments can be made to strengthen this assumption?

Singer, Peter. "Practical Ethics." *The Animal Ethics Reader*, edited by Susan J. Armstrong and Richard G. Botzler, Routledge, 2008, pp. 36-46.

Page # of *The Bedford Handbook* you used as a model for your entry: 17

PAGE	CONCEPT, DEFINITIONS, OR QUOTES, ETC.	NOTES/CONNECTIONS TO MYSELF
36	<p>"The capacity for suffering and enjoying things is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in any meaningful way."</p> <p>Perhaps the very first interest had by the first living thing was to avoid painful sensation, or to perhaps revel in its pleasurable counterpart.</p>	<p>This and many other aspects of Singer's thought seem to borrow from behaviorist conceptions of psychology. This is most likely because in considering the "humanity" of nonhuman animals, traditional means of communication are ineffective.</p> <p>Notwithstanding, ♥ this does seem intuitively true, which is of course the fullest empirical extent possible.</p>
38	<p>"As we shall see shortly, even if we were to prevent the infliction of suffering on animals only when the interests of humans will not be affected to anything like the extent that animals are affected, we would be forced to make radical changes in our treatment of animals [...]"</p> <p>Changes that may be small for humans could have significant effects on the lives of nonhuman animals. See following entry for related point.</p>	
39	<p>"In considering the ethics of the use of animal flesh for human food in industrialised societies, we are considering a situation in which a relatively minor human interest must be balanced against the lives and welfare of the animals involved. The principle of equal consideration of interests does not allow major interests to be sacrificed for minor interests."</p>	
43	<p>"The most decisive point, however, is that nonhuman animals are not capable of considering the alternatives open to them or of reflecting on the ethics of their diet. Hence it is impossible to hold the animals responsible for what they do [...]"</p>	<p>Compare to Regan's <i>moral patients</i>.</p>

45	<p>“In any case, at the level of practical moral principles, it would be better to reject altogether the killing of animals for food, unless one must do so to survive. Killing animals for food makes us think of them as objects that we can use as we please.”</p>	<p>It takes a society a certain level of sophistication to produce claims like this.</p> <p>This doesn't make them wrong; it just makes them... lofty.</p>
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Questions

1. Do Singer's theories permit the killing of a nonhuman animal to save a human? Alternatively, could there be any such situation where an animal's life would be valued over a human's?
2. Singer's book was written in the 1990's during a time when public opinion regarding nutrition was much different than it is today. Knowing what we know now, is worldwide vegetarianism (at least in the developed world) considered realistic?

Matthew Calarco, *Identity, Difference, and Indistinction*

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Page of the Bedford Handbook used as a model for the entry: page 18

Page	Concept, Definitions, Quotes, etc.	Notes/Connections to Myself
42	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The identity-based approach seeks to find similarity in moral identity between humans and animals. ● The approaches used are through the application of Darwinian ontology (recognizing and accepting that humans are related to all other animals) and normative impartiality (thus extending equal moral consideration to all animals as we do to humans). ● The rational moral agent has to disavow the species barrier as a persuasive reason for not extending full moral consideration to nonhuman animals 	<p>A full acceptance of Darwinian ontology necessitates somewhat of a breakdown of species barriers and human narcissism. If we accept that we are related to all animals, then by extension, there arises the point of having to extend moral consideration (even <i>equal</i> moral consideration) to all animals the same way we do to humans.</p>
43	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The merits of this approach are that it has necessitated a shift in thinking that “has, directly and indirectly, inspired a variety of new practices and forms of resistance aimed at granting basic ethical respect to nonhuman animals”. ● An important intellectual advancement that has arisen from this approach is the critical eye now cast on every attempt to draw clear distinctive boundaries between species. Simplistic human/non-human binaries in older Western traditions have needed re-examination. 	<p>Where clear human/non-human distinctions cannot be made, there remains no clear way for rational humans to distinguish between the ways in which humans should be treated as opposed to other animals. Speciesist views must then necessarily be abandoned.</p>
44	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● One drawback to an identity-based approach is the pro-intellectual, antipractical biases that philosophical circles have adopted in response to it. These circles debate the 	<p>The failings of this approach are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Debating its theoretical basis rather

	<p>theoretical and ethical frameworks for this approach (Utilitarian vs Kantian, for example), rather than using this approach as a means of practical political and social transformation.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The other drawback to this approach is the fact that even when this approach results in social change, this change is so minimalistic as to be barely present. “because of the atomistic-individualistic underpinnings of contemporary normative theory, questions surrounding animals end up being cast primarily in moral terms that revolve around personal responsibility and individual consumer-based market solutions”. Thus, this change is minimal because we seek to change society while working from the inside, rather than completely reconstructing it. 	<p>than seeking to apply it for practical results.</p> <p>b) Finding therapeutic solutions from inside the system, rather than preventative solutions from the outside.</p>
45	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● “There is an insistence among these theorists and activists that the ground of ethical transformation lies in a certain rational, reflective understanding of ethics, and that the primary motive for fighting for justice on behalf of animals comes down to reasons, that is, to the neutral, rational, and consistent extension and application of human-centred norms to nonhuman animals that are relevantly morally similar.” 	<p>From what I understand, logocentrism, in this case, falls under the larger issue of anthropocentrism, which is explored next.</p>
46-47	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Anthropomorphic extentionism: “granting ethical priority to animals that resemble human beings in morally relevant ways, while denigrating or giving subordinate status to those animals who do not “properly” resemble human beings”. ● “Western culture has consistently rotated around a space and a centre that was reserved for “the human” and that was always intended selectively to bring within its orbit only those beings who fit a relatively narrow set of criteria for inclusion in the circle of humanity proper...” ● “...Thus when animal ethicists seek to 	<p>Global research practices often have different criteria for the care extended to different classes of animals. For example, human subjects require the highest quality of care, followed by other primates, etc. Flies often don’t count as ‘animals’ with regards to research. Animals that display higher social skills and look increasingly similar to humans are often considered</p>

	<p>extend ethics to animals based on one or another of these traits that are deemed to be quintessentially human (but that turn out upon closer examination often to exist among certain animals), they are in fact extending this same logic and practice of anthropocentrism”.</p>	<p>the most susceptible to pain in these circumstances, and thus given the highest level of care and moral consideration.</p>
48	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “At stake in these struggles are protecting, developing, and sustaining modes of life that have never been considered “properly” human by the dominant culture and that have no desire to become so now. Struggling in alliance with these groups and collectives means learning to construct ontologies, epistemologies, and practices that are befitting a world that seeks to take leave of the exclusionary logic of anthropocentrism and that has no nostalgia for its reformation or expansion.” 	<p>In a similar sense to these struggles seen for equal rights and moral consideration seen throughout time, the struggle for animal rights must seek to reconstruct society, not merely change it from within its current anthropocentric view.</p> <p>Calarco calls for the abolition of classical versions of the human-animal distinction and asks that we devise new ways of thinking about and living with animals.</p>

1. Why is it that working from within the system (example, encouraging markets and consumers to be more conscience-driven) makes little to no difference in terms of amending the manner in which we treat animals? Is it practically possible to try to breakdown and reconstruct our society’s anthropocentric views?
2. What practices can we adopt from past and ongoing struggles for equal moral consideration (such as those militant struggles mentioned in the text) that will help breakdown the anthropocentric view of identity-association in order to make a significant practical change in the way animals are viewed and treated?

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Page of the Bedford Handbook used as a model for the entry: page 17

Page	Concept, Definitions, Quotes, etc.	Notes/Connections to Myself
19	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Moral agents: Have the ability to use impartial judgement to decide what is morally right or wrong, and then to choose to act upon these judgements. ● Moral agents can thus be held morally accountable for their actions. ● Moral patients: Lack the ability to make moral judgements and/or act upon them, and so are exempt from being held morally accountable for their actions. 	Here the author is placing animals in the category of moral patients.
20	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Moral patients are further categorized into: a) those who are sentient and capable of feeling pleasure and pain only and b) those who are sentient and possess more advanced cognitive abilities. Animals, based on their kind, may fall into either of the two categories. ● Regan here is interested in discussing animals who fall into category (b) ● The relationship between a moral agent and a moral patient is not reciprocal. With higher cognitive capabilities, the moral agent is held accountable for their acts towards a moral patient, but the opposite does not apply because the moral patient lacks the cognitive capability to do right or wrong, morally speaking. 	It seems here that the author is being anthropocentric in referring to cognitive abilities as a means by which to divide living beings into categories that essentially order them in their similarity to humans. By comparing human moral patients to animals, Regan is trying to make the reader relate to the animals, but seems to have fallen into the anthropocentric trap mentioned by Calarco in his text.
21	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Regan distinguishes the inherent value of a moral agent (the distinct value they have as an individual) from their intrinsic value (the value of their experiences) using the cup analogy. ● Regan positions himself as deontologist in this argument (the cup is more important than what is put in it) as compared to the utilitarian (what goes into the cup is more important than the cup itself). ● If all moral agents have equal inherent value (the cup is the same for all), then all moral agents must be given equal moral 	Regan is a deontologist, as opposed to Singer who is a utilitarian.

	<p>consideration, and the harm of any one moral agent cannot be justified on the basis of act utilitarianism.</p>	
<p>22</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● If one was to claim ‘being alive’ as simply a necessary factor for having inherent value, it leaves open the question of what then is sufficient. ● If one was to claim that ‘being alive’ as a sufficient factor for having inherent value, it leaves us open to owing equal moral consideration to humans as well as blades of grass or individual cells. ● Neither of these views is a realistic solution. Instead, Regan proposes the ‘subject-of-a-life’ criterion for having inherent value. Creatures that fall into category (a) do not fill this criterion, but those in category (b) do. ● A ‘subject-of-a-life’ is characterized as having beliefs, desires, perception, memory, a sense of the future, an emotional life with feelings of pleasure and pain, preference and welfare-interests, the ability to initiate actions in pursuit of desires and goals, a psychophysical identity over time, and individual welfare (life fares ill or well for them regardless of their utility to others and/or being the object of someone’s interest). ● Regan makes a claim that living beings under this criterion fall into either of two categories - those who are a subject-of-life and those who are not. There are no degrees of moral consideration, only absolutes. 	<p>Although this seems like a realistic solution, we seem to be on a slippery slope of anthropocentrism here as well. If, as moral agents, we are the ones deciding whether or not creatures fall into category (a) and (b), doesn’t that require judging them from an anthropocentric viewpoint?</p> <p>All defining characteristics of creatures that fall into (b) are characteristics <u>being determined by humans</u> as being crucial for having equal moral consideration. There is an implicit bias present here.</p>
<p>23</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The respect principle: we are to treat those individuals who have inherent value in ways that respect inherent value. Since all individuals who are the subject-of-a-life have equal inherent value, they have a right to equal consideration in the matter of justice. ● Regan draws a distinction between the types of harm an individual can undergo. A harm of deprivation takes away opportunities of an 	

	<p>individual to accomplish something in their best interests, while a harm of infliction detracts directly from an individual's welfare.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comparable harm: two harms are comparable when they detract equally from an individual's welfare, or from the welfare of two or more individuals 	
24-25	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minimizing the override: In situations which demand it, we must choose to override the rights of the few over the rights of the many (both of whom, in this scenario, are innocent). • This is derived from the respect principle. Since we must give equal respect to all, the numbers add up in cases where it is necessary to minimize the override. 	Here, Regan is adopting a utilitarian view.
25	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The worse-off principle: When choosing to harm the few versus the many, if the harm suffered by the few is intense and dilutable by choosing to harm the many, then we must choose to harm the many instead. • The lifeboat response: it would be a greater prima facie loss to throw a human aboard than a dog, because it forecloses more opportunities (harm by deprivation) 	Conclusion of the reading: Regan argues that non-human animals are what he called the "subjects-of-a-life", just as humans are, and that, if we want to ascribe value to all human beings regardless of their ability to be rational agents, then to be consistent, we must similarly ascribe it to non-humans.

1. What if a society does not ascribe equal value to all human beings? There are definitely some people in our current society who don't seem to. Does Regan's argument, which calls for extending our treatment of humans to treatment of animals (and rests on the acceptance of the inherent being more important than the intrinsic), then fall apart?
2. When considering the lifeboat scenario proposed by Regan, assuming that throwing the dog overboard incurs less of a loss is to be anthropocentric and inconsiderate of inherent value as compared to intrinsic value. What criteria is Regan using to determine that throwing the dog overboard causes less harm than throwing a human overboard? What if the dog was a rescue dog, and the human an alcoholic with a doomed liver who would die soon - would this impact the difference in harm being done? And if it does, then we hold intrinsic value important as well as inherent.

Peter Singer, *Practical Ethics*

Singer, Peter. "Practical Ethics" *The Animal Ethics Reader*, edited by Susan J. Armstrong and Richard G. Botzler, Routledge, 2008, pp. 36-46.

Page of the Bedford Handbook used as a model for the entry: page 17

Page	Concept, Definitions, Quotes, etc.	Notes/Connections to Myself
36	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The case for extending the principle of equality beyond the human species comes from a simple and clear understanding of the principle of equal consideration of interests.• Just as it is morally reprehensible for certain humans to distinguish between the treatment they mete out to other humans based on looks or intelligence, it is morally reprehensible to distinguish between the manner in which we treat individuals from other species, and to exploit them.	Singer's view here is straightforward and applicable in all scenarios to all beings, unlike that of Regan which seems conditional upon many distinctions that he seems to have constructed and which he assumes the reader agrees with.
37	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Bentham is quoted, and his view summarized by Singer thus: "the capacity for suffering as the vital characteristic that entitles a being to equal consideration".• "If a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration".• The limit of sentience (here, the capacity to suffer) is the only defensible boundary of concern for the interest of others. To mark this boundary using some other criteria is to mark it in an arbitrary way• Singer accepts the argument that different species feel pain to a different extent when encountering the same scenario, and that we must then seek to relieve the source of the greatest suffering if needing to choose between the two.	Singer's comparison of speciesists to racists brings forward a more real concern to light than thought experiments do. His argument is a compelling one. His argument for unequal suffering allows for the experimental use of animals in certain scenarios. How do we formulate a scale to compare the pain felt across species in response to a given scenario? Singer mentions on page 38 that a precise method is not

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • However, the principle of equal consideration still applies after equating the pain. 	possible.
38	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The suffering of anticipating pain is explored by Singer. He says that while it is true that humans, by anticipating suffering, suffer more than do animals when it comes to experiments, human infants and senile people also suffer less in that regards. Yet, we don't experiment on infants and senile people. This preference for reducing harm to one's own species is morally unjustifiable. • "Even if we were to prevent the infliction of suffering on animals only when the interests of humans will not be affected to anything like the extent that animals are affected, we would be forced to make radical changes in our treatment of animals that would involve our diet...it is hard to imagine any other change of moral attitude that would cause so great a reduction in the total sum of suffering in the universe". • Singer says that when it comes to the killing of animals, it cannot be said (whether right or wrong) that it is <i>speciesist</i> to consider the life of a self-conscious being capable of higher cognitive function more important than that of one which isn't. 	
39	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Animals as food: "In considering the ethics of the use of animal flesh for human food in industrialized societies, we are considering a situation in which a relatively minor human interest must be balanced against the lives and welfare of the animals involved. The principle of equal consideration of interests does not allow major interests to be sacrificed for minor interests". • Rearing practices for animals bred for meat and other products are, in themselves, very brutal. 	I found this page highly compelling in terms of the arguments it put forth against the consumption of animal flesh.
40-41	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Experimenting on animals: "Experimenters often seek to justify experimenting on 	As a Biology major who reads papers on animal

	<p>animals by claiming that the experiments lead us to discoveries about humans; if this is so, the experimenter must agree that human and nonhuman animals are similar in crucial respects”.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● In certain cases “the benefits to humans are either nonexistent or uncertain, while the losses to members of other species are certain and real”. This is a failure in equal consideration. ● Experimenters “show bias in favour of their own species whenever they carry out experiments on nonhuman animals for purposes that they would not think justified them in using human beings at an equal or lower level of sentience, awareness, sensitivity and so on. If this bias were eliminated, the number of experiments performed on animals would be greatly reduced. 	<p>experimentation, and has even conducted lab experiments on sea urchins and chick embryos in the past, this part of the paper made me re-think the necessity of the experiments I have performed in the past or read about.</p>
42	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Animals can feel pain: “Animals in pain behave the same way humans do, and their behaviour is sufficient justification for the belief that they feel pain”. The part of the nervous system in humans that is responsible for the sensation of pain has anatomical parallels in other beings. 	
43	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Animals eat each other, but that doesn’t mean we should eat them: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. “Most animals who kill for food would not be able to survive if they did not, whereas we have no need to eat animal flesh”. 2. “It is odd that humans, who normally think of the behaviour of animals as ‘bestly’ should, when it suits them, use an argument that implies we ought to look to animals for moral guidance”. 3. “Nonhuman animals are not capable of considering the alternatives open to them or of reflecting on the ethics of their diet”, whereas humans clearly are. 	
44	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The model of reciprocity and contractualism 	

	<p>here is rejected because nonhuman animals cannot consent to a social contract, nor can they reciprocate the harm caused in equal terms (here a parallel is drawn to the Atlantic Slave Trade and the Chad Basin Crisis as forms of socio-historical and environmental injustices).</p>	
45	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● It is easier to justify the killing of animals that are more distally removed in cognitive processes from humans than it is to justify the killing of those who are more proximal in the evolutionary tree. ● However, at the level of the practical moral principles, it is better to altogether reject the killing of animals for food, unless one must do so to survive. 	

1. Singer makes a compelling argument in favour of killing certain nonhuman animals by stating that these animals are incapable of feeling pleasure and pain beyond that of the most rudimentary type. In this context, he seems to be of a like mind when compared with Regan. Where would Singer draw the boundary between those who deserve equal moral consideration and those who do not?